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PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL CONFLICT: THE HOSPITAL
STAFF PRIVILEGES CONTROVERSY IN NEW YORK
Hospital staff privileges are the physician's key to the use of
hospital facilities. Without these privileges, the physician cannot
admit his patients to, and treat them in, the hospital. In recent
years the process by which American hospitals grant or deny these
staff privileges has become the focus of growing concern. Increas-
ing numbers of physicians have turned to the courts for protection
and aid in solving the problem. This Note will examine the con-
troversy from both the legislative and litigative standpoint, includ-
ing an analysis of state and federal judicial treatment. This exami-
nation is intended to provide the aggrieved physician and his attor-
ney with an overview of the staff privileges situation in New York,
with the purpose of providing guidance in the resolution of these
problems.
I
HISTORY OF THE HOSPITAL STAFF PRIVILEGES PROBLEM
A. General Background
Hospital staff privileges can best be defined as "the ability of a
member of a hospital staff ... to admit his patients to the hospital
for care."' Privileges are granted to the physician in various medi-
cal specialty areas, depending predominantly upon professional
competence.2 The physician does not become an employee of the
hospital. Nevertheless, the privileges enable the physician to benefit
from the hospital facilities as if he were an independent contrac-
tor.3
I McLaughlin, Public Hearing on Hospital Staff Privileges, 72 N.Y.S.J. MED. 2445 (1972).
2 See Horty, Hospital Must Specify Criteria for Medical Staff Membership, 115 MOD. Hosp.,
Oct. 1970, at 88, for a general discussion emphasizing the consideration of additional
factors, including the physician's temperament and his ability to function as part of a group.
3 Southwick, The Hospitals New Responsibility, 17 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 146, 155 (1968).
Under traditional independent contractor law, the hospital was able to insulate itself from
injuries caused by the physician's negligence. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 468 (4th ed.
1971). But see Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 50 I1. App. 2d 253, 200
N.E.2d 149 (1964), aff'd, 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946
(1966). Darling was the first case to hold a hospital responsible for the negligent acts of
physicians on its medical staff. Previously, the injured patient was only able to sue the
physician, but Darling imposed a duty on the hospital to ensure that quality care was
rendered under its auspices. The impact of the case in the health-care field has been likened
to that of the Palsgraf case in the area of general negligence. Springer, Medical Staff Law and
the Hospital, 285 NEw ENG. J. MED. 952, 954-55 (1971).
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The hospital's role in modern society has undergone a sig-
nificant evolution. Whereas the hospital initially served as a quaran-
tine facility to isolate the sick from the healthy, it evolved during
the 1960's to serve as the physician's workshop. 4 The hospital has
moved beyond this stage and now exists as the primary community
health-care center. By integration of a sophisticated system of
health-care units, it serves patients far beyond the needs and
capabilities of the individual physician.5
The sophistication of the modern hospital and of current
medical science make hospital affiliation a professional and finan-
cial necessity for the physician. 6 In addition, the continuing educa-
tion, both formal and informal, provided through hospital affilia-
tion is essential to maintaining the physician's competence.7 How-
ever, the physician's need for privileges must be balanced against
the hospital's desire to maintain a high standard of quality care.
For this reason, hospitals have established comprehensive proce-
dures for the selection of physicians for staff privileges, in addition
to yearly reevaluations of current staff members.
The application procedure normally follows three steps.9 The
applicant is first evaluated by a credentials committee, composed of
physicians and administrative personnel. This committee reviews
the applicant's standing in the medical community by referring to
4 Kauffman, Hospital-Physician Relations, 2 Hosp. MED. STAFF, Dec. 1973, at 24, 25.
5 Springer, supra note 3, at 953; see also Moore v. Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe
Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 211-12, 495 P.2d 605, 608, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Kauffman,
supra note 4.
6 It has been said that "[w]ithout staff privileges the modem physician is professionally
crippled and his patients are endangered." Hearings on S. 5610 Before the New York State
Senate Comm. on Health, Sept. 24, 1971 (statement of M. C. McLaughlin, Commissioner, New
York City Department of Health) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. See also Moore v.
Board of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 88 Nev. 207, 213, 495 P.2d 605, 609, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 879 (1972) (dissenting opinion), for judicial recognition of the importance of staff
privileges.
7 Letter from E. D. Pellegrino, M.D., Dean, School of Medicine, State University of New
York at Stonybrook, to State Senator Tarky Lombardi, Jr., Sept. 27, 1971, on file at the
Cornell Law Review.
8 The hospital is not only concerned with its level of care as it is perceived by the
potential patient population, but the hospital must also be concerued with possible responsi-
bility for the negligent acts of staff physicians. See note 3 supra. Therefore, the hospital
considerations are not limited to an image-conscious feeling, but also include a desire to limit
this potential liability.
9 Senate Hearings, Nov. 5, 1971 (statement of E. A. Aksel, Central New York Hospital
Association, Inc.). See generally JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, Ac-
CREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS 1970 (1971); JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF
HOSPITALS, GUIDELINES IN THE FORMULATION OF MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS, RULES AND REGU-
LATIONS (1971); Porterfield, Granting of Clinical Privileges-Part 2, 2 HosP. MED. STAFF, May
1973, at 5, 6-7.
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letters of recommendation, prior training, license status, and other
similar criteria.10 The recommendation of the credentials commit-
tee is forwarded to a medical executive committee, composed solely
of physicians, for further consideration of the applicant's medical
qualifications. Finally, all recommendations are forwarded to the
ultimate decision maker, the hospital governing board, which is
normally composed of- laymen."
As the sole authority for determining hospital accreditation,
the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals has enormous
impact on all hospital procedures.12 Beyond the staff privileges
application procedure, the Joint Commission recommends an ex-
tensive hearing and appeal mechanism, guaranteeing protection of
the due process rights of the physician. 13 This is consistent with the
current position of the American Medical Association.1 4 Therefore,
10 Senate Hearings, supra note 9. See also Porterfield, Evaluation of Physician Performance'in
the Credentials Process, 3 Hosp. MED. STAFF, Nov. 1974, at 34.
11 The composition of the hospital governing board is currently the center of another
major controversy. There has been much discussion concerning medical representation on
the lay governing boards. See, e.g., Mack, Can Physicians Influence Hospital Policy?, 1 Hosp.
MED. STAFF, April 1972, at 25-28; Sherman, The Physician as Trustee, 1 Hosp. MED. STAFF,
March 1972, at 2.
12 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals [hereinafter cited asJ.C.A.H.] is
an independent organization whose purpose is to improve the quality of patient care in
hospitals throughout the United States and Canada. In addition to setting minimum
standards of quality, the J.C.A.H. provides many procedural guidelines for internal opera-
dons. The Commission grants accreditation to hospitals after inspection of the facility and a
determination that there has been compliance with the necessary standards.
Although a hospital is not legally compelled to seek J.C.A.H. accreditation, many
hospitals participate in the program. An important consideration is the fact that accredita-
tion will satisfy the great majority of prerequisites for participation in the federal Medicare
program. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1901(b) (1974). For additional information on theJ.C.A.H. and its
functions see AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION REFERENCES
(1957); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE FUNCTIONS
OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS (1956); N.Y. Times, March 31,
1975, at 54, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 23, 1975, § 1, at 43, col. 2.
The significance of J.C.A.H. accreditation has also been considered by some courts in
staff privileges cases. E.g., Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363 (D. Ore. 1975);
Rao v. Board ofCounty Comm'rs, 80 Wash. 2d 695,698,497 P.2d 591,593, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1017 (1972).Butsee Hoberman v. Lock Haven Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974), where
the court refused to accord any significance to J.C.A.H. guidelines because the J.C.A.H. is a
private body, even though federal and state funding is premised on accreditation in many
instances. Id. at 1187-88.
'3 JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, GUIDELINES IN THE FORMULA-
TION OF MEDICAL STAFF BYLAWS, RULES AND REGULATIONS, art. VIII, 21-30 (1971).
14 The position of the American Medical Association has been stated as follows:
The basic principles of a fair and objective hearing should always be accorded to
the physician whose professional conduct is being reviewed. These basic guarantees
are: a specific charge, adequate notice of hearing, the opportunity to be present and
to hear the evidence, and to present a defense.
Brief for A.M.A. as Amicus Curiae at 5, Martin v. Catholic Medical Center, 35 N.Y.2d 901,
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strong external influence is placed upon all hospitals to provide the
proper protection for the physician whose staff privileges are
affected.
1 5
The physician may be confronted by many problems through-
out this application and review procedure. These problems may
include racial discrimination, 6 denial of various due process re-
quirements,' 7 hiring moratoria based on bed capacity' 8 or geo-
graphic factors, 19 discrimination based on the type of medical spe-
cialty,2" or simply anti-competitive, monopolistic motives on the
part of the hospital.21 Once denied either initial appointment or
subsequent reappointment, the physician is normally left without
any recourse. 22 For this reason, physicians have turned to the
courts for help.
B. Judicial Intervention
During the past ten years, physicians, in increasing num-
bers, have brought their hospital staff privileges complaints to
the courts. The problem became a major controversy in the
late 1960's,23 and prompted some legislatures to enact limited
324 N.E.2d 362, 364 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1974). See also AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 20 (1971).
Is However, the continuing presence of staff privileges problems makes it apparent that
this external influence is inadequate. For example, physicians have alleged that these
external controls can be circumvented through the implementation of monopolistic prac-
tices. See note 143 and accompanying text infra.
" Cypress v. Newport News General & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th
Cir. 1967) (black physician denied staff privileges by an all-white hospital medical staff);
Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 938 (1964) (black physicians and patients totally denied any access to hospital facilities).
17 Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1971) (notice of the charges and
ight of cross-examination held to comply with minimum standards of due process); Citta v.
Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 308 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (ight to a hearing prior to the
reduction of the privileges); Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Soc'y, 39 Cal. App. 3d 623,
114 Cal. Rptr. 681 (Ct. App. 1974) (right to a hearing prior to the deprivation of privileges).
18 Davis v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 106 N.J. Super. 33, 254 A.2d 125 (Ch. 1969)
(hospital moratorium on granting of staff privileges due to inadequate bed space).
19 Id.; Letter from E. D. Pellegrino, supra note 7. A hospital utilizing a geographic
moratorium would require a "relationship between the hospital, the physician using the
hospital, and the community of people to be served," before staff privileges would be
granted to any individual. Id.
20 Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 76 N.J. Super. 149, 183 A.2d 878 (L. Div. 1962), aff'd,
40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963) (osteopath excluded by hospital bylaws); State ex rel.
Carpenter v. Cox, 61 Tenn. App. 101, 453 S.W.2d 69 (1969) (osteopath excluded by hospital
bylaws).
21 See note 15 supra.
22 The New York statutory scheme has presented the' physician with a new, viable
alternative. See notes 144-93 and accompanying text infra.
23 This observation is based upon the volume of litigation, in addition to the abundance
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legislation.2 4 But the focus of the controversy was clearly the
judiciary.
The courts initially faced the problem of the public-private
dichotomy.2 5 In the case of the public hospital, the courts did not
hesitate to intervene.2 6 The public hospital was treated in the same
way as a public or municipal corporation.2 7 The physician was pro-
tected from arbitrary or capricious action as the courts scrutinized the
problem to assure reasonable regulations and procedures.2 8
However, with respect to a hospital chartered as a private
corporation, the courts were much more hesitant to act. Relying
upon the classic doctrine of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood-
ward,'29 the courts were unwilling to intervene in the internal
of law review articles written on the subject. See, e.g., Ludlam, Physician-Hospitl Relations: The
Role of Staff Privileges, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 879 (1970); Southwick, Hospital Medical
Staff Privileges, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (1969); Note, Denial of Hospital Staff Privileges: Hearing
and Judicial Review, 56 IowA L. REv. 1351 (1971); Note, Hospital Staff Privileges: The Need for
Legislation, 17 STAN. L. REv. 900 (1965); Note, Selection of Hospital Staff Members, 40 U. CIN. L.
REv. 797 (1971); Note, The Physician's Right to Hospital Staff Membership: The Public-Private
Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. U.LQ. 485. See also Annot., 37 A.LR.3d 645 (1971); Annot., 24
A.L.R.2d 850 (1952).
24 See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-12.1-5-1 (Burns 1973) (hospitals must have reasonable
regulations and cannot discriminate among schools of medicine); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1301 (West 1974) (nonprofit hospitals may not discriminate against physicians that
participate in medical group practice and may not require membership in a specialty body or
medical society as prerequisite to the granting of staff privileges); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-8-12 (1974) (protection of the rights of osteopathic surgeons); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LA'v
§ 206-a (McKinney 1971) (protection of those physicians involved in medical group practices
and nonprofit health insurance plans); ORE. REV. STAT. § 441.077 (1973) (hospitals cannot
discriminate among schools of medicine); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 34-8-8 (1972 Rev.)
(county hospitals cannot discriminate among schools of medicine); Wyo. STAT. ANN
§ 35-97.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (hospitals must have reasonable rnles and regulations and
cannot discriminate among schools of medicine).
25 Hospitals can generally be classified as either public or voluntary-not-for-profit
(private). This topic has been thoroughly considered in Note, The Physician's Right to Hospital
Staff Membership: The Public-Private Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. U.LQ. 485. A third category of
hospitals is growing in size and importance. This group is composed of facilities organized
by physicians or other interested persons and is operated on a profit-making basis. This
Note does not deal with these private, profit-making hospitals because their recent sig-
rrificance has not yet manifested itself in the staff privileges area.
26 See, e.g., North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1962); Wallington v.
Zinn, 146 W. Va. 147, 118 S.E.2d 526 (1961).
27 North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Mizell, 148 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1962).
2'8 See, e.g., Martino v. Concord Community Hosp. Dist., 233 Cal. App. 2d 51, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 255 (1965); Bryant v. City of Lakeland, 158 Fla. 151, 28 So. 2d 106 (1946); Jacobs v.
Martin, 20 N.J. Super. 531, 90 A.2d 151 (Ch. 1952). See also note 24 supra.
29 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819):
[P]ublic corporations are such only as are founded by the government for public
purposes, where the whole interests belong also to the government. If, therefore,
the foundation be private,' though under the charter of the government, the
corporation is private, however extensive the uses may be to which it is devoted,
either by the bounty of the founder, or the nature and objects of the institution.
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operating procedures of the private hospital. This hesitancy empow-
ered the private institution to grant or deny staff privileges with
unfettered discretion and without justification.30 The first slight
modification of this judicial noninterference occurred when the
courts began to require that hospitals follow their own bylaws in
granting or denying staff privileges. 31
It may be asked why the private hospital should be accorded any
different treatment from that given a private association of any other
type.32 Unlike the private country club or fraternal organization that
is formed solely to benefit its members, both the private, nonprofit
hospital and the public hospital are formed to meet the health needs
of a particular community. 33 The community therefore has an in-
terest in the quality of medical care that is available at the facility. In
order to protect this interest and assure the highest possible quality
levels, properly qualified physicians must not be unreasonably
excluded.
This reasoning led the New Jersey courts in Greisman v. New-
comb Hospita3 4 to take the first major step in abrogating the
public-private distinction. The trial court recognized the general
public duty of all hospitals, and concluded that judicial interven-
tion was necessary to protect the public's right to efficiently oper-
ated medical facilities.3 5 In unanimously affirming the lower court
Id. at 668-69. But compare the following subsequent statement by the Court:
Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to
make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore,
one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect,
grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the
public for the common good, tb the extent of the interest he has thus created..
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876).
3' Edson v. Griffin Hosp., 21 Conn. Supp. 55, 144 A.2d 341 (1958); Levin v. Sinai
Hosp. of Baltimore City, Inc., 186 Md. 174, 46 A.2d 298 (1946).
3" Shiffman v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 709, 314 N.Y.S.2d
823 (1st Dep't 1970); Gluck v. Lenox Hill Hosp. (Sup. Ct.), in 153 N.Y.L.J., April 26,
1965, at 17, col. 3. The impact of these decisions becomes more significant as the J.C.A.H.
guidelines begin to play a more important role.
3'2 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), where the Court refused to
characterize the racially disriminatory policies of the Moose Lodge as state action. The
Moose Lodge was a local chapter of a national fraternal organization that had been issued a
liquor license by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. The Court refused to find that the
state had "significantly involved itself with [the] invidious discriminations." Id. at 173, quoting
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967). The Court characterized the Lodge as a
"private club in the ordinary meaning of that term." 407 U.S. at 171.
3 A prerequisite to the establishment of a hospital in New York is a finding by the
Public Health Council that there is a "public need for the existence of the institution at the
time and place and under the circumstances proposed." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw
§ 2801-a(3) (McKinney 1971).
3' 76 N.J. Super. 149, 183 A.2d 878 (L. Div. 1962), aff'd, 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817
(1963).
3' 76 N.J. Super. at 157-58, 183 A.2d at 882. The court based both the public duty of the
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decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court imposed a fiduciary duty
on the hospital in relation to the public when passing on questions
involving staff privileges. 36
The Greisman decision opened the ddor to judicial scrutiny of
private hospitals. Using the fiduciary capacity rationale, the courts
began to act with a much freer hand.37 A second rationale for
intervention was based upon federal and state funding of private
hospitals.38 The most significant form of this funding has been that
granted under the Hill-Burton Act, 39 which provides federal sub-
sidies to public and other nonprofit facilities for hospital construction
and modernization programs. This funding has been the focal point
of many federal jurisdictional controversies, often providing the basis
for a finding of state action. 40 The immediate consequence of this
finding is the application of constitutional guarantees, most impor-
tantly the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, thereby
providing additional protection for the physician.
41
II
LITIGATION IN NEW YORK
A. Public Hospitals
The public hospital is created by a municipal or government
charter that vests management responsibility in a board of direc-
hospital and the public's right to medical care on the monopolistic position of the hospital.
The Newcomb Hospital was the only hospital within an expansive geographic, metropolitan
area. Furthermore, the certificate of incorporation specifically provided that the hospital be
used for the residents of the area. The court concluded that this control must carry with it
certain public responsibilities that the hospital could not shirk because of its private status.
Id. at 156-58, 183 A.2d at 881-82.
36 Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 401-04, 192 A.2d 817, 824-25 (1963).
37 See, e.g., Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Haw. 475, 482, 497 P.2d 564, 570, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972) (fiduciary trust relationsbip between the hospital, its staff and
the public). But see Gonzales v. Personal Collection Serv., 494 P.2d 201, 206 (Wyo. 1972),
where the members of the hospital board of trustees were characterized as fiduciaries, but
were accorded a presumption of regularity on decisions relating to hospital management
and operation.
38 Federal funding is provided under various programs. These include Medicare,
Medicaid, and Hill-Burton funds to supplement hospital construction. State funding nor-
mally takes the form of tax exempt status granted all hospitals. Greisman also discusses the
impact of public contributions. 76 N.J. Super. at 157, 183 A.2d at 882.
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1970).
'1 See notes 74-106 and accompanying text infra.
41 An example of the impact of the fourteenth amendment is found in Foster v. Mobile
County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968). In Foster, two black physicians had been
denied staff privileges. The court invoked the equal protection clause because "members of
the same class (i.e. physicians)" had not been accorded equal treatment. Id. at 230. The
court also relied upon the due process clause in attacking the hospital bylaws and application
procedures as patently unfair. This pattern repeats itself throughout the federal court cases.
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tors appointed by the government entity involved.42 Thus, there is
a clear connection with the state, and any discriminatory proce-
dures can be attributed directly to the state.
The classic New York case involving physicians' rights in
public hospitals is Alpert v. Board of Governors.43 The plaintiff physi-
dan had been denied reappointment after ten years on the active
medical staff. He alleged that the decision was arbitrary and,
because he had not been given notice of the charges or an oppor-
tunity for a hearing, that he had been denied due process. The
court examined the duty of the public hospital in relation to the
community that it serves. The conclusion reached was that the
public hospital does not possess unbridled discretion and cannot
arbitrarily exclude persons, whether physicians or patients, from
the facility.44 Alpert was a major step in New York; it recognized the
courts' ability to examine the internal operating procedures of
public hospitals to assure their reasonableness.
This initial step proved fruitful for the plaintiff in Alpert and
for physicians faced in the future with a similar dilemma.45 Al-
though it restated the doctrine that the physician has "no constitu-
tional right to practice medicine in a public hospital, 46 the court
recognized that a physician could not be denied the use of a public
hospital on the basis of unreasonable rules or regulations.
47
Further bolstering the rights -of the physician, the court said:
If the right of the general public to use the hospital is to have
any meaning, they must have the concurrent right to be treated
by their own physicians, unless the latter are excluded for
adequate cause.48
Therefore, the court not only granted substantial new rights to the
physician, but also granted concomitant rights to the patient.
42 See Van Campen v. Olean General Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 206, 205 N.Y.S. 554,
556 (4th Dep't 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E. 219 (1925), for a narrow New York
definition of a public hospital.
43 286 App. Div. 542; 145 N.Y.S.2d 534 (4th Dep't 1955).
44 Id. at 547, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
45 See, e.g., Tuchman v. Trussel, 43 Misc. 2d 255, 250 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1964), where the
court reviewed the termination of a physician's privileges at a city hospital. Although the
Alpert case was not specifically relied upon, the court examined the hospitars charter and
bylaws without hesitation. The court concluded that the provisions had not been followed
and, therefore, that the termination was invalid.
46 286 App. Div. at 547, 145" N.Y.S.2d at 538. See also note 108 and accompanying text
infra.
47 Id. at 546, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 537.
41 Id. at 547, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 538. For a codification of this right of patients, see IND.
ANN. STAT. § 16-12-23-1 (Burns 1973).
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The Alpert court took one additional step in strengthening the
case of the physician denied reappointment, as opposed to initial
appointment. Without mandating specific guidelines, the court
reasoned that by continued practice in the public hospital, the
physician acquired "a species of tenure. '49 A necessary component
of this tenure is the guarantee of notice and an opportunity to be
heard when the hospital decides whether to revoke staff
privileges. 50
B. Private Hospitals
There has been a clear division within the courts throughout
.the country as to their ability to intervene and limit the discretion
of the private hospital governing board.51 The New York ourts
adhere to the majority position in refusing to interfere in dis-
cretionary private hospital decisions.52
As in the public hospital area, New York case law is based
upon a single classic decision, Van Campen v. Olean General Hospi-
tal.5 3 In Van Campen, a physician denied reappointment argued
that the acceptance of government and municipal funds would
transform the otherwise private facility into a public institution.
However, the court emphatically rejected this argument: "The fact
that they may receive a donation from the government . . . or
funds from a city or county . . . does not affect their character as
private institutions. '54 The court concluded that a public hospital
was one established by a municipality and not by a private corpora-
don.55
The conclusion that the hospital was private prevented the Van
Campen court from examining the hospital's internal operating
procedures. The court found no absolute right of the patient or
the physician to use the facilities of a private hospital, in contrast to
a public hospital.56 The court explained that the private hospital's
49 286 App. Div. at 548, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 539. Compare Gluck v. Lenox Hill Hosp. (Sup.
Ct.), in 153 N.Y.L.J., April 26, 1965, at 17, col. 3, where the court refused to grant tenure
status in a dispute involving a private hospital.
50 286 App. Div. at 548, 145 N.Y.S.2d at 539.
51 See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
'2 For a further explanation of the majority position see Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 645, 659
(1971).
53 210 App. Div 204, 205 N.Y.S. 554 (4th Dep't 1924), aff'd, 239 N.Y. 615, 147 N.E.
219 (1925).
54 Id. at 207, 205 N.Y.S. at 556.
5 Id. at 206, 205 N.Y.S. at 556.
56 Id. at 209, 205 N.Y.S. at 558.
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directors must have almost unlimited discretion, and could not be
interfered with in the absence of bad faith or fraud.
57
The court specifically dealt with the physician's due process
contentions, concluding that a hearing was unnecessary. 58 There-
fore, in this seminal New York decision, the hospital was granted, in
the court's own words, "wide discretion. ' 59 The unrestrained
power permitted by the Van Campen decision presents many prob-
lems for the physician, as the potential for abuse by the hospital is
increased. 60
If the hospital's purpose is to serve the public and provide the
community with an efficient health-care center, the public or
private character of the hospital should not be controlling.
Nevertheless, the New York courts have refused to abandon the
public-private distinction. 61 Physicians in New York have tried
countless legal theories to invoke the courts' protection, but con-
tinue to be unsuccessful.
62
Although the New York courts continue to adhere to this
unrealistic distinction, there are signs of a gradual retreat. While
refusing to interfere with the discretionary decisions of the private
hospitals, the courts have examined, on numerous occasions, their
bylaws and internal procedures. 63 This examination has two ele-
57 Id., 205 N.Y.S. at 557-58.
58 Id. at 208, 205 N.Y.S. at 557.
5 '"They [the hospital's directors] have wide discretion in determining policies, and its
exercise in a given matter is not subject to review by the court unless, there is clearly error in
the performance of a legal duty." Id. at 209, 205 N.Y.S. at 557-58.
60 For recent criticism of the Van Campen formulations see Senate Hearings, Nov. 5, 1971
(statement of A.E. Gunn, Legislative Committee Chairman, Monroe County Medical So-
ciety).
61 Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n, 33 Misc. 2d 3, 229 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1960),
aff'd, 13 App. Div. 2d 746, 216 N.Y.S.2d 664 (lst Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 205, 182
N.E.2d 393, 227 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1962); Manczur v. Southside Hosp., 16 Misc. 2d 989, 183
N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Zlotowitz v. Jewish Hosp., 193 Misc. 124, 84 N.Y.S.2d 61
(Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 974, 100 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1st Dep't 1950).
62 Halberstadt v. Kissane, 51 Misc. 2d 634, 273 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct. 1966), affd, 31
App. Div. 2d 568, 294 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dep't 1968) (presence of federal and public
funding); Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n, 33 Misc. 2d 3, 229 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct.
1960), affd, 13 App. Div. 2d 746, 216 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 205,
182 N.E.2d 393, 227 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1962) (hospital bylaws created a contractual right);
Manczur v. Southside Hosp., 16 Misc. 2d 989, 183 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (third party
beneficiary of contract between hospital and medical staff); Loewinthan v. Beth David
Hosp., 9 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (action for malicious injury).
63 Shiffman v. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 709, 314 N.Y.S.2d
823 (1st Dep't 1970); Halberstadt v. Kissane, 51 Misc. 2d 634, 273 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct.
1966), aff'd, 31 App. Div. 2d 568, 294 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dep't 1968); Leider v. Beth Israel
Hosp. Ass'n, 33 Misc. 2d 3, 229 N.Y.S.2d 134 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 13 App. Div. 2d 746,




ments: (1) the court questions whether the hospital has properly
followed its own procedures; (2) the court questions the reason-
ableness of the procedures.
With respect to the first element of the examination of private
hospitals' internal procedures, the court seeks to protect the physi-
dan from arbitrary action by the hospitals in their application of
their own bylaws. 64 Therefore, if the hospital's procedures require
a hearing, the physician must be granted one.65 Concomitantly, if a
hearing is not guaranteed, the court will not interfere with the
discretion of the hospital to refuse one. 66 However, the require-
ment of a hearing would seem to have much impact today due to
the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospi-
tals. These guidelines require detailed procedural protection for
the physician, including the right to a hearing.67
In considering the second element, the court performs a
balancing function in seeking to keep the private hospital in its
insulated position, but at the same time trying to assure that a
physician is not unreasonably excluded. In Kurk v. Medical Society 61
the court examined the reasonableness of a regulation excluding
osteopaths from the county medical society, a private organization.
Membership in the society was a prerequisite to membership on a
nearby hospital staff.69 Although concluding that the regulation
was consistent with state policy, the court recognized that if the
physician was in a position of economic necessity due to the
monopolistic position of the society, a cause of action would exist.70
There is no sound explanation why this same reasoning cannot be
64 However, this applies only to the bylaws of the hospital, not to bylaws promulgated
by the medical staff in their independent capacity. Manczur v. Southside Hosp., 16 Misc. 2d
989, 183 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
15 Gluck v. Lenox Hill Hosp. (Sup. CL), in 153 N.Y.L.J., April 26, 1965, at 17, col. 3.
'6 Leider v. Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n, 33 Misc. 2d 3, 5, 229 N.Y.S.2d 134, 136 (Sup. Ct.
1960), aff'd, 13 App. Div. 2d 746, 216 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 205,
182 N.E.2d 393, 227 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1962). The court set forth a narrow standard for
intervention:
A board of trustees of a private, voluntary hospital ... is charged only with the
duty of exercising best judgment, and the board cannot be controlled in the
reasonable exercise and performance of that duty. The members have wide
discretion in the exercise of their judgment, and equity will not attempt to correct
errors of judgment absent manifest failure in the performance of a legal duty.
Id. at 5-6, 229 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
67 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
68 24 App. Div. 2d 897, 264 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d Dep't 1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 928, 223
N.E.2d 499, 276 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1966).
69 Id. at 898, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
70 Id.
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applied to the private hospital, at least when the physician can
show economic hardship.
7'
Finally, the New York courts have maintained the Van Campen
position, despite changing case law throughout the country, in their
treatment of the effect of public funding on the private hospital.
7 2
The courts have specifically refused to characterize hospitals receiv-
ing Hill-Burton funds, Medicare and Medicaid supports, tax
exempt status, and other public contributions as participating in
state action.73 The courts have thus foreclosed another possible
mode of attack for physicians denied staff privileges in private
hospitals.
III
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The physician aggrieved by a denial of staff privileges has one
remaining judicial alternative: the federal courts. Jurisdiction in
staff privileges cases has normally been based upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3),74 and the cause of action has been based upon 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.75 These statutes relate to deprivations of federal rights,
privileges or immunities and, in both instances, it is necessary for
71 See note 6 supra.
72 See notes 77-106 and accompanying text infra. See also Senate Hearings, supra notes 6
& 60; Minutes of the 1974 House of Delegates, Governmental Affairs and Legal Matters, 74
N.Y.S.J. MED. 1236, 1272 (1974), for general recognition of this changing case law by
interested persons in New York.
73 Halberstadt v. Kissane, 31 App. Div. 2d 568, 294 N.Y.S.2d 841 (3d Dep't 1968);
Martin v. Catholic Medical Center (Sup. Ct.), in 169 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1973, at 16, col. 5,
aff'd, 43 App. Div. 2d 540, 349 N.Y.S.2d 690 (lst Dep't 1973), aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 901, 324
N.E.2d 362, 364 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1974). See also Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial
Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y 1971).
74 This section provides in relevant part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
7' This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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the physician to prove the requisite "color of state law." This
requirement is easily satisfied in the case of a public hospital,7 6 but
has caused a sharp split among the federal courts when private
hospitals are the focus of the dispute.
77
The basis of the jurisdictional controversy has been the effect
of governmental involvement in the form of state and federal
regulation, and funding provided under the Hill-Burton pro-
gram.7 8 Some federal courts have stated that the reception of
Hill-Burton funds by an otherwise private hospital confers federal
jurisdiction and "the obligation to observe Federal Constitutional
mandates. 17 9 A New Hampshire district court has reluctantly rec-
ognized that "the weight of authority holds that the acceptance of
Hill-Burton funds is sufficient to cloak a private hospital and its
medical staff with a mantle of state law."80 Another group of
federal courts has based jurisdiction on substantial governmental
involvement in both the regulatory and funding areas.81 An impor-
tant factor in these decisions has often been the proportion of the
accepted funds to the general operating budget.8 2 Finally, one
76 It is apparent that in the case of the public hospital state action is present and federal
jurisdiction can be readily invoked. See Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839 (5th Cir.
1971); Sosa v. Board of Managers of the Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1971).
7 See notes 78-106 and accompanying text infra.
78 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-291o (1970). See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra, for an
explanation of the funding.
79 Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (footnote
omitted). See also Christhilf v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 496 F.2d 174 (4th
Cir. 1974); Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969); Meyer v.
Massachusetts Eye & Ear Infirmary, 330 F. Supp. 1328 (D. Mass. 1971).
so Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp., 339 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D.N.H.), aff'd sub
nom. Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973)
(footnote omitted). However, the court of appeals specifically excluded the district court's
ruling on the state action issue from its final decision affirming the holding against the
plaintiff physician. 468 F.2d at 1231.
"1 The most important federal regulatory guidelines are set out in the Federal Health
Insurance for the Aged Programs (Medicare and Medicaid). Hospital qualification for funds
under these programs is contingent upon certain procedures being followed within the
institution. These include procedural standards for the medical staff appointment process
and guidelines for appointment qualifications. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1021, .1023 (1974).
State involvement is embodied in the various state hospital codes regulating icensure of
hospitals and internal operating procedures. A comprehensive example is the New York
State Hospital Code. See notes 136-43 and accompanying text infra.
As examples of this group of cases, see O'Neill v. Grayson County War Memorial Hosp.,
472 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir.
1971); Suckle v. Madison General Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D. Wis. 1973), aff'd, 499
F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974).
82 See, e.g., Chiaffitelli v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971), where 14%
of the hospital's budget was derived from governmental funds. These statistics were enough
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court has considered only the general function of the hospital,
rejecting as immaterial the public or private status of the institu-
tion.
8 3
Conversely, many federal courts in this situation have refused
to recognize any basis for federal jurisdiction. On the question of
acceptance of Hill-Burton funds, it has been said that this does not
create "personal rights or causes of action as such, nor does it
confer jurisdiction on federal courts of controversies involving civil
or other personal rights. '8 4 Even in cases where there is significant
funding and governmental regulation, jurisdiction has been re-
fused .85
The Southern District of New York, the only federal court in
the state to consider the problem, has twice declined to accept
jurisdiction. In Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hospital,s6
the court expressed its view with the following strong language:
There can be little doubt that the State of New York plays a
substantial role in supervising the operations of private hospitals
within its borders.... [But this] does not make the acts of these
hospitals in discharging physicians the acts of the state.
8 7
The basis for this general line of reasoning seems to be the lack of
causal connection between the state conduct and the resultant
wrong to the physician. 88 This reasoning was further articulated in
a three-pronged state action test by the Southern District in Barrett
v. United Hospital.89 The Barrett court held that state action could
to clothe the hospital with public status. Id. at 430. But see Ward v. Saint Anthony Hosp., 476
F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973), where the hospital received five percent of its total construction
costs under the Hill-Burton program, during a 13 year period. The court held that this
small percentage was insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. at 675. In a subsequent
case, a hospital had received approximately 30% of its construction costs under the
Hill-Burton program during a four year period. However, the court distorted the figures
and concluded that the funds received were again insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction.
Ozlu v. Lock Haven Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 285, 286 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
83 Duffield v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.W. Va. 1973), aff'd,
503 F.2d 512 (4th Cir. 1974). The court specifically stated that "[tihe public or private
status of the hospital . . . is not considered material." Id., at 401 n.2.
84 Don v. Okmulgee Memorial Hosp., 443 F.2d 234, 235 (10th Cir. 1971).
8- Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Ozlu v. Lock Haven Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
86 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
7 Id. at 1023.
88 Id.; see also Ward v. Saint Anthony Hosp., 476 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973); Hoberman
v. Lock Haven Hosp., 377 F. Supp. 1178 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
89 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974). The
prerequisites for a finding of state action are:
(1) that the state's involvement with the private institution is "siguificant," (2) "that
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not be present "in the absence of a nexus between the governmental
function performed and the violative activity alleged."90 Therefore,
because the denial of the privileges was entirely that of the hospital
and was "in no way fostered, approved or encouraged" 91 by the
state, the test was not satisfied. 92
TheMulvihill court analogized the staff privileges situation to the
expulsion of a student from a private school.9 3 However, this com-
parison fails to recognize the basic health-care function of the hospi-
tal and the severe impact on the physician.9 4 The private school serves
as an alternative means of education, whereas the private hospital, in
many communities, is the only facility of its kind. Although the
expelled student may reenter the public schools, the physician with-
out privileges will be professionally crippled and may be forced to
relocate his practice.9 5 Both the student and the physician will be
the state must be involved not simply with some activity of the institution ... but
with the activity that caused the injury"... (3) that the state's involvement must aid,
encourage or connote approval of the complained of activity.
Id. at 797. (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). The court further detailed two
situations where there is a departure from strict adherence to the tests: racial discrimination
and public function cases. The former was inapplicable and the court believed that the latter
was not satisfied because the private hospital did not perform a traditionally governmental
function. Id at 797-99.
'0 Id. at 799 (footnote omitted). This finding was made despite allegations by the
plaintiff that the hospital was performing a public function, accepted significant Hill-Burton
funding and tax exemptions, was extensively regulated by a pervasive statutory scheme, and
was the only facility in a large geographic area. Id at 796. The court specifically rejected any
notion that the geographic monopoly migbt give the hospital a quasi-public status. Id at 799.
Contra, Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 76 N.J. Super. 149, 156-57, 183 A.2d 878, 882-83 (L.
Div. 1962), aff'd, 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963).
"' 376 F. Supp. at 805. But see Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363 (D.
Ore. 1975), where, in a similar situation, the court concluded that state action existed within
the confines of the three-prong Barrett test. Both courts rejected many of the same factors as
a basis for state action. Compare Id. at 367-69 with note 90 supra. However, the Aasum court
concluded that the presence of specific regulations promulgated by a state board of medical
examiners established the necessary nexus. 395 F. Supp. at 369. Although the court went on
to conclude that the existing discrimination was justified under the fourteenth amendment,
the utilization of a state medical board, a very common regulatory body, as a basis for
federal jurisdiction, could bave far-reaching impact on future staff privileges decisions.
92 The court also considered the impact of N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2801-b (McKinney
Supp. 1974). Although the plaintiff could not avail bimself of the law's protection because he
was denied privileges 12 days before the law became effective, the court again refused to
find any state action based on the presence of the law:
[T]he mere fact that the state has legislated in the area of the conduct complained
of does not in and of itself constitute sufficient participation to be appropriately
denominated "state action".
376 F. Supp. at 805.
03 329 F. Supp. at 1024.
4 See notes 5-6 and accompanying text supra.
9 See note 6 supra.
stigmatized, but the burden and the costs of relocating will far
outweigh those of reentering the public school.
The attitude of those federal courts denying jurisdiction in
staff privileges cases was recently buttressed by the Health Pro-
grams Extension Act of 1973.96 The purpose of the Act was to
extend a group of expiring health programs, among them Hill-
Burton funding, and to give the Congress a reasonable time to
consider the programs' merits and future needs. 97 In response to
the growing controversy over hospital freedom to make facilities
available for abortions and sterilization procedures, the Congress
specifically limited the courts' power to require a hospital to per-
form these operations, premised on the receipt of federal funds
under the Act.98 The stated congressional purpose was to provide
that
receipt of financial assistance under any of the aforementioned
Acts does not constitute legal basis for ajudicial or administrative
order .... requiring the provision of personnel or facilities by
any entity for the performance of sterilization or abortion .... 99
Congress also provided that hospitals receiving such funds could
not discriminate in the granting of staff privileges for any reasons
relating to the performance of, or refusal to perform, abortions or
sterilization operations by a physician applicant.100
These provisions are confined solely to controversies involving
the use of hospital facilities and discrimination against physicians
related to abortion and sterilization operations. There is no evi-
dence that Congress intended to circumscribe the discretion of the
federal courts iri all staff privileges cases when considering the
factors necessary to determine the "color of state law" jurisdictional
prerequisite.10' However, in two cases admittedly involving
96 Health Programs Extension Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-45, 87 Stat. 91 (June 18,
1973).
97 H.R. REP. No. 227, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973).
98 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (Supp. III 1973).
:9 H.R. REP. No. 227, supra note 97, at 15.
00 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (Supp. 111 1973). See notes 102-04 and accompanying text
infra, for additional discussion of this section.
101 There is no one specific test for this determination. However, the state court in
Adler v. Montefiore Hosp. Ass'n, 453 Pa. 60, 311 A.2d 634 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131
(1974), articulated a two-pronged test for determining state action consistent with the
guidelines of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The first
situation in which state action exists is where a
hospital which receives funds in large measure from public sources and through
public solicitation, receives tax benefits by reason of its nonprofit and nonprivate
character, and holds a virtual monopoly in the area it serves.
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abortion-related controversies, the courts made broad, unsup-
ported statements that they were prohibited from finding state
action in any situation based upon the acceptance of Hill-Burton
funds.10 2 Furthermore, although it is unclear from the opinion, it
seems that the physician in Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center1 3 was
denied staff privileges solely because he desired to perform abor-
tions at hospitals other than the Mercy Medical Center. The court
disregarded the congressional mandate specifically prohibiting this
type of discrimination and inaccurately characterized the physi-
cian's position as a demand that Mercy Medical Center's facilities
be made available for the performance of abortions, thereby ac-
cording the hospital protection under the Act.
10 4
It is clear that the federal courts have failed to provide
uniform guidelines to deal with jurisdictional controversies in this
area. In New York, the only federal court to consider the staff
privileges problem has aligned itself with those that refuse to grant
jurisdiction.10 5 However, due to the ever-changing state of the law
in the federal courts, and the current trend toward according the
private hospital a quasi-public status,10 6 it is important that the
New York physician be cognizant of the treatment of the staff
privileges cases in the federal courts that have accepted jurisdic-
tion.
The basic premise for judicial scrutiny of the staff privileges
453 Pa. at 70, 311 A.2d at 639-40. The second independent situation occurs when a hospital
"receives construction funds from the federal government and participates generally in the
benefits available under the Hill-Burton Act." Id. at 71, 311 A.2d at 640. A federal district
court in New York has utilized a three-prong test. See note 89 supra.
012 Taylor v. Saint Vincent's Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973); Watkins v.
Mercy Medical Center, 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973). But see Ozlu v. Lock Haven Hosp.,
369 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. Pa. 1974), where the court fails to find state action but makes no
mention of 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7.
103 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973).
104 Id. at 801.
105 Barrett v. United Hosp., 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mere., 506 F.2d 1395 (2d
Cir. 1974); Mulvihill v. Julia L. Butterfield Memorial Hosp., 329 F. Supp. 1020 (S.D.N.Y.
1971). It is also interesting to note that the area encompassed by the Southern District, i.e.,
New York City, is the area in the state where the staff privileges problem is most acute. In
1971, the Commissioner of the New York City Department of Health stated that between 20
and 30% of licensed physicians in New York City did not have staff privileges. Senate
Hearings, supra note 6. See also note 150 infra.
106 Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Haw. 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1048 (1972) provides the best explanation of this general trend. The court recognized that
patients are the primary concern of hospitals. Therefore, although the hospital is still private
in the non-governmental sense, once there is nominal government involvement in the form
of funding, the hospital's power to process staff applications becomes fiduciary and subject
to judicial review. Id. at 482, 497 P.2d at 570. See also note 72 and accompanying text supra.
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process can be found in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners.10 7
Although the Supreme Court has held that a physician has no
constitutional right to practice medicine in a hospital, 08 in Schware
the Court stated:
A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or
from any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that con-
travene the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 10 9
Furthermore, it is apparent that fourteenth amendment freedoms
include the right of an individual to engage in any occupation free
from unreasonable interference "under the guise of protecting the
public interest," but which, in fact, has no relation to a purpose
"within the competency of the State to effect."110 Therefore, once a
hospital has been characterized as acting under "color of state law"
these guidelines must apply.
Although many federal courts have accepted jurisdiction of
staff privileges cases, they have remained hesitant to review the
discretionary hospital decisions."' This hesitancy reflects the belief
that the previously rendered peer review of a physician is a more
accurate evaluation than any judgment that could be made by a
court." 2 In cases involving controversies over professional compe-
tency, the court will give considerable weight to the findings of the
hospital.
The key issue litigated in the federal courts has been the due
process rights of the physician,"13 involving predominantly the
physician's right to a hearing and his right to be confronted by the
evidence against him. A Pennsylvania district court has held that a
hearing must be afforded at some point during the process of
revocation or suspension of privileges."14 However, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has recognized that the state of the
107 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
108 Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414, 416-17 (1927).
109 353 U.S. at 238-39 (footnote omitted).
110 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
111 Sosa v. Board of Managers of the Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173, 177
(5th Cir. 1971) (limited judicial surveillance); Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 637, 641 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (strictly limited).
112 Suckle v. Madison General Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196, 1209 (W.D. Wis. 1973), affd,
499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974); Sosa v. Board of Managers of the Val Verde Memorial Hosp.,
437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971).
113 For recent considerations of this issue, see Poe v. Cbarlotte Memorial Hosp., Inc.,
374 F. Supp. 1302 (W.D.N.C. 1974) and Note, Denial of Hospital Staff Privileges: Hearing and
Judicial Review, 56 IowA L. REv. 1351 (1971).
114 Citta v. Delaware Valley Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301, 308-09 (E.D. P'a. 1970).
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law on this question is unsettled.115 The case before the Tenth
Circuit involved an initial denial of staff privileges and the court
ruled that although a hearing was not necessary, the physician was
"entitled to overall fairness and a good faith consideration of his
qualification and background."1 6 In other similar situations, fed-
eral courts have ordered the hospitals to conduct a hearing when a
case was still at the pretrial stage.
1 7
Another aspect of the due process issue has been the composi-
tion of the hearing board, that is, whether persons who have
previously considered the evidence may participate in the ultimate
hearing. There has been no specific ruling on the issue, but one
court has held that the tribunal must be impartial."' In general, it
has been said that the decision-making process need not be "as
antiseptic in this context [of staff privileges decisions] as it is
required to be, for example, in a criminal prosecution."1 19
The standards used to evaluate due process in staff privileges
cases are flexible. Although each case has been judged on the
specific fact situations involved, the necessary components can best
be summarized in the following manner:
Due process normally requires that [the hospital] give advance
notice of the charges in sufficient detail to permit intelligent
response, and allow the accused doctor full opportunity to appear
and be heard, to question and cross-examine adverse witnesses and
accusers, to challenge the accusations of wrong doing, and to
present evidence in his own behalf. 20
Therefore, it would seem that once a physician can successfully
invoke federal jurisdiction, he will be accorded considerable due
process protection by the courts. This protection should enable the
physician to defend his position in the overall context of a fair
decision-making process.
IV
LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK
Applicable legislation can be examined in two separate
categories. First, the state possesses a series of laws regulating the
"1 Don v. Okmulgee Memorial Hosp., 443 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1971).
116 Id. at 238.
117 Schooler v. Navarro County Memorial Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Tex. 1973);
Duffield v. Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 361 F. Supp. 398 (S.D.W. Va. 1973), affd, 503 F.2d 512
(4th Cir. 1974).
118 Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1971).
119 Suckle v. Madison General Hosp., 362 F. Supp. 1196, 1210 (W.D. Wis. 1973), aff'd,
499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974).




practice of medicine and the operation of hospitals.1 21 Second,
legislation dealing specifically with staff privileges controversies has
been enacted. 122 An examination of each category follows.
A. Medical Licensure
In New York, the power to issue professional licenses is vested
in the department of education. 23 Issuance of licenses is super-
vised by the state board of regents, which in turn appoints a state
board of medicine to assist it. 24 Included as part of the statutory
guidelines is a list of qualification requirements. 25 These criteria
are very general in nature and, with respect to the applicant's
experience and character, are determined by vague, subjective
standards. 2 6
Some states use similar medical licensure proceedings as a
basis for providing the physician with a right to hospital staff
privileges.' 27 For example, Indiana provides that a licensed physi-
cian is eligible for staff privileges at any hospital, whether public or
private' 28 Although the hospital is granted the power to make
reasonable rules and regulations, in the case of a county-supported
facility the burden of proof is on the institution to justify the
regulations.
29
However, possession of a medical license should not be the
sole criterion for determining eligibility for staff privileges. In New
York, possession of a medical license confers a life-long privilege
on the licensee to practice the profession in the state, unless the
license is revoked, annulled, or suspended by the board of re-
gents.1 30 Furthermore, there is no requirement of reevaluation to
maintain the validity of the license, but only a requirement of
biennial registration with the department of education.' 3 ' Thus,
121 N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 6500-28 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1974); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW §§ 2800-10 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1974).
122 See notes 144-93 and accompanying text infra.
123 N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6504 (McKinney 1972).
124 Id. §§ 6504, 6523.
125 Id. § 6524. For a thorough discussion of these requirements see Quirin, Physician
Licensing and Educational Obsolescence: A Medical-Legal Dilemma, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 503
(1972).
126 The applicant must "be of good moral character" and have "experience satisfactory"
to the state board of medicine. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6524 (McKinney 1972). See also 8
N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 28.1-.6.
127 See IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-12.1-5-1 (Bums 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 34-8-8
(1972). Contra, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 147.23 (1970).
128 IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-12.1-5-1 (Burns 1973).
129 Id. §§ 16-12-23-1, -12.1-5-1 (Burns 1973).




since revocation procedures are rare, 3 2 the state does not vouch
for the continuing competence of the practitioner, but only sets a
minimum standard. 33
Once it is recognized that possession of a state license is not
commensurate with a continuing high level of medical competence,
it is evident that the license alone should not guarantee staff
privileges. 34 The hospital must have the ability to promulgate
additional rules and regulations to determine the eligibility for
staff privileges. 35 The inquiry into professional competence can-
not be limited to the possession of a license, although the license
may provide prima facie evidence of competence.
B. Hospital Regulation
Related to the regulation of physicians' licenses is the regula-
tion of hospital operations within the state. Under article 28 of the
New York Public Health Law, the state department of health has
the "central, comprehensive responsibility for the development and
administration of the state's policy with respect to hospital[s]."' 36
This regulatory power specifically includes both public and private
hospitals within the state.' 37 Article 28 provides general guidelines
for the hospitals, but more specific regulations are contained in the
State Hospital Code.' 38 These regulations provide guidelines for
all internal operating procedures, including the organization and
administration of the medical staff.'3 9
132 Generally speaking, because disciplining by way of revocation or suspension is a
drastic measure, it is resorted to infrequently. Quirin, supra note 125, at 507.
133 Compare Dunbar v. Hospital Authority of Gwinnett County, 227 Ga. 534, 540, 182
S.E.2d 89, 93 (1971); Rao v. Board of County Comm'rs, 80 Wash. 2d 695, 699, 497 P.2d
591, 593, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1017 (1972), with Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Haw.
475, 487-88, 497 P.2d 564, 573, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972) (concurring opinion);
Porter Memorial Hosp. v. Harvey, 279 N.E.2d 583, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). In the latter
two cases, the courts determined that state licensure evidenced a legislative intent to set the
standard of competency for physicians and thereby preempted a hospital's power to
consider different standards.
134 Dunbar v. Hospital Authority of Gwinnett County, 227 Ga. 534, 182 S.E.2d 89
(1971).
13' See notes 147-53 and accompanying text infra. See also Senate Hearings, Sept. 24, 1971
(statements of Hospital Association of New York State and M.C. McLaughlin, Commis-
sioner, New York City Department of Health).
136 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2800 (McKinney 1971). Specifically, no hospital can be
established in the state without written approval of the Public Health Council. Id. § 2801-a.
But see N.Y. Times, March 31, 1975, at 1, col. 1, for an example of the practical problems
faced in controlling hospitals in the state.
137 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2800 (McKinney 1971).
138 10 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 700.1-782.14. The authority for promulgating these rules is found
in N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2800 (McKinney 1971) and N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 102 (McKinney
1972).
139 10 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 720.1-724.2.
1975] 1095
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The State Hospital Code provides comprehensive rules govern-
ing the application procedure for staff privileges. 140 The Code spe-
cifically requires that a due process mechanism be available for physi-
cians denied initial appointment or subsequent reappointment . 4'
Furthermore, the Code incorporates the standards of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals by requiring that the
hospital bylaws be consistent with those standards. 42
At first glance, the State Hospital Code would seem to provide
adequate protection for any physician involved in a staff privileges
controversy. However, the recurrent problems faced by physicians
in the staff privileges area reveal that these guidelines can be easily
circumvented. This is often accomplished by the monopolistic
practices implemented by those physicians in controlling positions.
It has been alleged that these physicians have the ability to delay
unreasonably staff applications and often to cast deciding votes on
applicants who will be their eventual competitors. 43
C. Staff Privileges Legislation
The first legislative attempt to regulate hospital staff privileges
in New York occurred in 1963. The legislature passed Section
206-a of the Public Health Law making it an "unlawful dis-
criminatory practice" to base a denial of staff privileges on "par-
ticipation [by the physician] in any medical group practice or
non-profit health insurance plan authorized by the laws of the
state . . ,,144 Section 206-a, although limited in its application,
provides a comprehensive scheme for dealing with alleged viola-
tions. 145 The department of health is granted extensive powers to
140 Id. § 720.1, .5(6), 721.1.
141 Id. § 720.1(c)(3).
142 Id. § 721.1(c). The impact of the J.C.A.H. is apparent throughout the Code. An
application for an operating certificate must include a statement as to whether the institution
is accredited by the J.C.A.H. (Id. § 70 1.1(a)), therefore implying that this may be a factor in
the department's consideration. Furthermore, the department must be notified as to any
change in the status of J.C.A.H. accreditation. Id. § 720.4.
143 These allegations were voiced by physicians in testimony given before the state
Senate Committee on Health. NEw YORK STATE SENATE CommiTTEE oN HEALTH, REPORT OF
ACTIVITIES 12-13 (Dec. 31, 1971) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
144 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 206-a(1) (McKinney 1971). This includes action by the
hospital to deny or withhold the privileges, or to exclude, expel, curtail, terminate, or
diminish the privileges.
145 A deputy commissioner of the department of health is granted the power to conduct
an investigation of the situation upon the receipt of a duly verified complaint. Id.
§§ 206-a(2), (3). If this investigation results in a finding of probable cause, the complaint is
credited and the deputy commissioner seeks to eliminate the problem by "conference,
conciliation and persuasion." Id. § 206-a(3). If settlement cannot be reached, a formal
hearing is conducted. Id. § 206-a(4). A finding that the hospital has violated the section
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investigate complaints and to resort to judicial enforcement if
necessary. 146 Although the physician is accorded a thorough
method of review and protection, the limited application of section
206-a minimizes its value.
In 1971, the state Senate faced the problem of hospital staff
privileges discrimination in broad, general terms. In response to
complaints of arbitrary discrimination against qualified physicians
within certain medical specialties, a bill was proposed to establish
concrete guidelines in the granting of hospital staff privileges.
47
These guidelines were limited to "public, objective standards, based
on professional competence.' ' 48 The enforcement mechanism in
the proposed law closely paralleled that in section 206-a. 49
Introduction of this bill signified legislative recognition that
hospital discrimination was an identifiable problem in New York150
and that the courts were not providing a satisfactory avenue for its
resolution.' 5 ' The proposed legislation sought to correct the prob-
lem by premising the privileges on narrow standards of compe-
tency and by providing a strong enforcement mechanism vested
with the power to correct any discriminatory situation.
5 2
results in a cease and desist order issued by the department of health. Id& § 206-a(6). The
statute also provides for judicial review of the final order and mandates that "[t]he findings
of the hearing officer as to the facts shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence
on the record considered as a whole." Id. § 206-a(10).
There are additional procedural guidelines applicable only to § 206-a included in the
State Hospital Code. 10 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 95.1-.12.
146 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 206-a(I0) (McKinney 1971).
147 (1971) Sen. Int. No. 5610 (Mr. Langley). See SENATE REPORT 9.
14S (1971) Sen. Int. No. 5610, § 2 (Mr. Langley).
149 Compare id. §§ 7-11 width notes 144-46 and accompanying text supra.
150 In 1971, as many as 30% of New York City-area physicians were without staff
privileges, albeit a small minority of those were by choice. Senate Hearings, supra note 6. In
the Albany area, although all physicians had privileges at a minimum of one hospital, there
was evidence that monopolistic practices had effectively excluded many physicians from the
most prestigious hospital in the area. SENATE REPORT at 12-13. But see Senate Hearings, Nov.
5, 1971 (statements of A.E. Gunn, Legislative Committee Chairman of Monroe County
Medical Society and R.L. Scheer, Onondaga County Medical Society), indicating that
discriminatory practices are not present in the upstate area.
151 Legislation as a necessary protection was a theme sounded throughout the hearings.
See Senate Hearings, supra notes 6 & 60 and letter from E.D. Pellegrino, supra note 7. But see
Senate Hearings, Nov. 5, 1971 (statement of R.L. Scheer, Onondaga County Medical Society)
and Dec. 7, 1971 (statement of the Medical Society of the State of New York) where the
necessity of legislation was questioned.
152 The proposal included provisions for detailed investigatory proceedings after a
physician had claimed that he was aggrieved by unlawful hospital practices. (1971) Sen. Int.
No. 5610 §§ 3-9 (Mr. Langley). Upon the culmination of the investigation and a finding that
the hospital had, in fact, violated the law, the commissioner of the department of health was
empowered to issue a cease and desist order. Id. § 7. To assure ultimate compliance with the
law, the commissioner was further empowered to obtain court enforcement of this order. Id
§ 11.
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The bill met substantial opposition because of the proposed
limitation on the hospitals' ability to determine standards for the
granting of staff privileges. Much of the criticism directed at the
bill's restriction of discretion was voiced by those in favor of some
form of staff privileges legislation. 15 3 Other opponents were se-
verely critical of the potential ability of physicians to obtain unlim-
ited, multiple staff appointments. 154 It was contended that mul-
tiple appointments would bave two damaging effects: the inability
of the physician to meet the demands of numerous hospitals,'55
and the potential overstaffling of certain hospitals.
56
Additional criticism focused upon the lack of special treatment
for teaching hospitals1 5 7 and the general feeling that statewide
legislation was unnecessary. 58 It was also argued that since the
153 Senate Hearings, supra note 6. A recurrent theme was that the required public,
objective standards could not be the sole criteria for granting privileges. Id., Dec. 7, 1971
(statements of E.G. Gooby, Administrator, St. Luke's Hospital, Newburgh and of the Medical
Society of the State of New York). The fear expressed was that a hospital would be unable to
deny privileges to a state-licensed physician because the state board of medicine had
previously set down public, objective standards of competence. Id. (statement of T.L.
Hawkins, Director, Albany Medical Center); see also note 127 and accompanying text supra.
This would endanger the ultimate goal of providing optimal health-care to the public. See
notes 130-35 and accompanying text supra.
154 Letter from E.D. Pellegrino, supra note 7. Multiple staff appointments appeared
possible if the hospitals would be unable to deny privileges to any competent physician.
However, this fails to recognize that minimization of appointments could be considered
when determining public, objective standards of competence.
'55 Staff privileges are not limited to the use of hospital facilities, but require the
physician to accept certain responsibilities in the hospital. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note
6. At some point, it is unlikely that a physician would be able to meet the demands imposed
by numerous hospitals, indirectly endangering the quality of care in a specific hospital.
Letter from E.D. Pellegrino, supra note 7. It has been argued that this possibility militates in
favor of some form of geographic limitation, requiring a community of interest between the
physician seeking staff privileges and the hospital. Id. See also Senate Hearings, Dec. 7, 1971
(statement of T.L. Hawkins, Director, Albany Med. Center).
'56 Overstaffing is likely to occur once the physician is assured of privileges at any
hospital he desires. Physicians would gravitate to the better equipped, more prestigious
hospitals, at the expense of the smaller hospitals. This could result in a severe maldistribution
of available health care, precluding efficient, quality care to the public. Senate Hearings, Sept.
24, 1971 (statement of R. Lawrence, President, N.Y. State Society of Anesthesiologists); Id.,
Dec. 7, 1971 (statement of Sister E. Lawlor, Exec. Director, St. Peter's Hospital, Albany). The
consequences of overstaffing have been characterized as "at least as adverse to quality care as
improper denial of [staffJ privileges." Senate Hearings, Dec. 7, 1971 (statement of the Medical
Society of the State of New York).
'57 See Senate Hearings, supra note 6; Id., Nov. 5, 1971 (statement of D. Oken, Chrmn.,
Department of Psychiatry, Upstate Medical Center); Letter from C.A. Ashley, Director, Mary
Imogene Basset Hospital, Cooperstown to State Senator Tarky Lombardi,Jr., Nov. 15, 1971, on
file at the Cornell Law Review.
158 Senate Hearings, Sept. 24, 1971 (statement of The Rev. Monsignor C. Kane, Director,
Division of Health and Hospitals, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of New York); Id., Dec.
7, 1971 (statement of Sister E. Lawlor, Director, St. Peter's Hospital, Albany).
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Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals had recently estab-
lished new guidelines for the granting of staff privileges, these
guidelines should be allowed to operate without interference and
should be given the opportunity to remedy the problem. 5 9 The
cumulative effect of these criticisms led to a conclusion by the State
Senate Committee on Health that the legislative proposal based on
public, objective standards of competence would be no more effec-
tive than the new Joint Commission guidelines; both could be easily
circumvented.' 60 However, the Committee recognized the need for
an appeal board that would provide protection for physicians, but
would not establish limiting guidelines for criteria in the granting
of privileges.'
6 '
As a direct result of the 1971 Health Committee hearings,
New York Senator Tarky Lombardi, Jr. proposed a bill in 1972,
which incorporated the Committee's recommendation for an ap-
peal mechanism.' 62 The bill sought to establish an independent
review board under the auspices of the Public Health Council. 63
The declared purpose of the board was to "allow both parties to
present their cases . . . in an informal and completely confidential
manner," thereby promoting settlement.
64
Unlike the previous proposal, the legislation sponsored by
Senator Lombardi won the approval of the general consensus of
interested parties.' 65 Because the 1971 hearings had revealed that
discriminatory practices were prevalent in certain areas of the state,
the proposal received enthusiastic support in the legislature, result-
ing in the enactment of section 2801-b of the New York Public
Health Law.
66
1"9 Senate Hearings, Dec. 7, 1971 (statements of Hospital Ass'n of New York State and Sister
E. Lawlor, Director, St. Peter's Hospital, Albany). But see Senate Hearings, supra note 60.
160 SENATE REPORT 13.
161 Id. at 14.
162 (1972) Sen. Int. No. 8092-A (Mr. Lombardi).See letter from H. Morse, Director, Senate
Committee on Health, to the Cornell Law Review, Sept. 20, 1974, on file at the CornellLawReview.
See also SENATE REPORT 13-14; NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, INC., NEW YORK STATE
LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 1972, at 195 (1972).
16 Letter from Senator Tarky Lombardi, Jr. to M. Whiteman, Counsel to the Governor,
April 17, 1972, on file at the Cornell Law Review.
164 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, supra note 162.
16 Letter from H. Morse, supra note 162.
166 The overwhelming support for the action was evidenced by a unanimous vote in the
state Senate (195 N.Y. SENATE JOURNAL 306 (1972)), and a near unanimous vote in the state
assembly (195 N.Y. AssemblyJournal 1265 (1972) ((1972) Assy. Int. No. 9256-A (Ms. Cook))).
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-b (McKinney Supp. 1974) provides:
1. It shall be an improper practice for the governing body of a hospital to
refuse to act upon an application for staff membership or professional privileges or
to deny or withhold from a physician, podiatrist or dentist staff membership or
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The most obvious difference between the law as enacted and
the legislation as proposed in 1971 is the lack of enforcement
machinery in the final version. The initial power of the Public
Health Council to accept a verified complaint and to conduct an
investigation, originally lodged with a deputy commissioner of the
department of health, remains intact.167 However, if the investiga-
tion reveals that the physician has a legitimate grievance, the
Council's power is limited to crediting the complaint, advising the
hospital of its decision, and requesting the hospital to review its
files.' 68 The Council no longer has the ability to petition the courts
professional privileges in a hospital, or to exclude or expel a physician, podiatrist or
dentist from staff membership in a hospital or curtail, terminate or diminish in any
way a phypician's, podiatrist's or dentist's professional privileges in a hospital,
without stating the reasons therefor, or if the reasons stated are unrelated to
standards of patient care, patient welfare, the objectives of the institution or the
character or competency of the applicant.
2. Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an improper practice as defined in
this section may, by himself or his attorney, make, sign and file with the public
health council a verified complaint in writing which shall state the name and
address of the hospital whose governing body is alleged to have committed the
improper practice complained of and which shall set forth the particulars thereof
and contain such other information as may be required by the council.
3. After the filing of any such complaint, the public health council shall make
a prompt investigation in connection therewith. In conducting such investigation,
the public health council is authorized to receive reports from the governing body
of the hospital and the complainant, as the case may be, and the furnishing of such
information to the public health council, or by the council to the governing body or
complainant, shall not subject any person or hospital to any action for damages or
other relief. Such information when received by the public health council, or its
authorized representative, shall be kept confidential and shall be used solely for the
purposes of this section and the improvement of the standards of patient care and
patient welfare. The records of such proceedings shall not be admissible as evidence
in any other action of any kind in any court or before any other tribunal, board,
agency, or person. If the council shall determine after such investigation that cause
exists for crediting the allegations of the complaint, the council shall promptly so
advise the governing body of the hospital against which the complaint was made,
and shall direct that such governing body make a review of the actions of such body
in denying or withholding staff membership or professional privileges from the
complainant physician, podiatrist or dentist or in excluding or expelling such
physician, podiatrist or dentist from staff membership or in curtailing, terminating
or in any way diminishing such physician's, podiatrist's or dentist's professional
privileges in the hospital.
4. The provisions of this section shall not be deemed to impair or affect any
other right or remedy.
In 1973, the Virginia legislature enacted a similar statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-
211.16 (Gum. Supp. 1974). Although the Virginia statutory purpose is identical to that of
New York, i.e. prevention of improper hospital practices in the context of staff privileges
disputes, the statute does not include the detailed investigatory procedures that are a part of
section 2801-b. However, if the State Board of Health finds that a hospital has committed an
improper practice, as defined by the statute, then the Board has the power to suspend or
revoke the hospital operating license. Id. This is one area where section 2801-b is in-
sufficient. See notes 170-172 and accompanying text infra.
167 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw §§ 2801-b(2), (3) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
168 Id. § 3. A complaint is formally credited by the Council after a detailed investigatory
procedure that includes the evaluation of evidence submitted by both sides. Id. See also note
1100
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for enforcement of the order.1 6 9 This lack of enforcement power
has been the focus of much criticism and renewed calls for
stronger legislation.17 0 In 1974, an amendment was introduced in
the state Assembly to empower the Council to direct a hospital "to
provide [a] physician . . . with the next available staff membership
or professional privileges arising within such physician's... profes-
sion, field of specialization and/or department in such hospital."'
71
However, the proposed amendment never reached the floor of the
legislature for a vote.'7 2 Despite these criticisms, the chairman of
the Public Health Council has expressed his belief that the law is
accomplishing its purpose through a deterrent effect on the hospi-
tals.1
73
Two apparent advantages of the law are its initiation of "a
mechanism for dialogue and input from a disinterested, therefore,
objective third party," and its ability to reduce prolonged legal
proceedings.74 During the first two years of the statute's existence,
sixteen complaints have been filed with the Council.175 Some of
these complaints have involved physicians denied initial appoint-
ment to hospital staffs.17 6 This group of physicians had never
before attempted to utilize the judicial forum as a means of solving
their problem in New York. They had previously been hesitant to
become involved in litigation and publicize their problem to a
potential patient population.1 77 Instead, it was easier to relocate a
new practice or to seek privileges at another hospital within the
174 infra. The statute requires that there be cause to credit the complaint. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2801-b(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
' See note 146 and accompanying text supra. Although N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-c
(McKinney Supp. 1974) does provide that the courts can enjoin any violations of article 28 when
requested to do so by the Public Health Council, this would not seem effective because § 2801-b
provides that all proceedings are confidential and "shall not be admissible as evidence in any
other action of any kind." N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-b(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
170 See Minutes of the 1974 House of Delegates, supra note 72; Editorial, Bill of Rights for the
Doctor, 74 N.Y.S.J. MED. 40 (1974).
171 (1974) Assy. Int. No. 8904 (Mr. Stavisky).
172 The bill never left the Assembly Health Committee. 1974 NEW YORK LEGISLATIVE
RECORD AND INDEX A522.
173 Letter from N.S. Moore, M.D., Chairman, Public Health Council, to the Cornell Law
Review, Sept. 9, 1974.
174 Letter from D.C. Walker, M.D., Assistant Comm'r for Health Manpower, to the Cornell
Law Review, Sept. 11, 1974.
After the physician has filed the required verified complaint with a detailed chronology of
the facts, the hospital is notified and requested to respond to the challenge. The Public Health
Council thereafter reviews all facts and decides whether to credit the complaint. This entire
procedure may take anywhere from six to seven weeks. Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
117 NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL, supra note 162.
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area. The law now provides that all proceedings are to be kept
confidential, 7 8 thereby protecting the physician from unwanted
publicity and providing him with a viable forum.
Once a physician's complaint has been credited, the Council
has had limited success in attempting to reach final resolution of
the particular dispute. In most instances, the hospital has agreed to
make a bona fide effort to review its files, but the Council is
without power to follow up or to compel additional action.'
7 9
Strong policy statements have been made, however, in a number of
cases.' 81 The Council has declared that a requirement that an
osteopath have completed an AMA-approved internship or resi-
dency program in order to qualify for staff privileges is inappro-
priate.' 8 ' Furthermore, the Council has stated that a hospital's
refusal to participate in a section 2801-b review is unwarranted
when based upon the fact that the excluded physician has previ-
ously filed a complaint in court.'
8 2
The implicit authority of the Council was evident in a case
where a physician denied initial appointment filed a section 2801-b
complaint. Before the complaint could be fully investigated, the
hospital reversed its decision and placed the physician on its
staff. 83 In another case, where a physician alleged that he was
denied fair appeal procedures, the Council followed the guidelines
of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. The hospi-
tal was informed that it did not comply with these guidelines, and it
is now considering the alteration of its procedures. 84 These last
two instances are obvious examples of the deterrent effect of the
law on the hospitals. The Public Health Council is an arm of the
state department of health, which has the sole authority for hospi-
tal licensure; 85 therefore, there is at least indirect pressure on the
state's hospitals to comply with the law.
To date, there have been only two judicial tests of section
2801-b. In Martin v. Catholic Medical Center 86 the plaintiff com-
178 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-b(3) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
179 Letter from D.C. Walker, supra note 174. See notes 167-72 and accompanying text
sup ra.
180 These statements have been generously supplied by Dr. Walker and do not violate the
confidentiality provisions of the statute because anonymity of the parties has been retained.




185 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 220, 2801-a (McKinney 1971).
186 Martin v. Catholic Medical Center (Sup. CL), in 169 N.Y.L.J, Jan. 12, 1973, at 16, col.
5, af/'d, 43 App. Div. 2d 540, 349 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Ist Dep't 1973), affd, 35 N.Y.2d 901, 324
N.E.2d 362, 364 N.Y.S.2d 893 (1974).
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plained that his administrative, but not clinical, privileges had been
withdrawn, allegedly without due process. The physician sought to
use section 2801-b as evidence of the requisite due process stan-
dards. The court rejected this approach, and outlined the limits of
the law:
[T]he language of the statute itself dearly demonstrates that it
was intended to cover hospital staff appointments and privileges,
that is, the ability to admit and treat patients in a hospital. It is
clear that it does not in any way cover the internal management
or administration of hospitals and has no effect on supervisory
or administrative positions therein.18
7
More recently, in Barrett v. United Hospital,18 8 the aggrieved physi-
dan introduced the statute as evidence of a pervasive state regula-
tory scheme that exemplified the state's concern with the staff
privileges problem and thereby warranted a finding of state ac-
tion. 8 9 The district court rejected this theory, reasoning that the
presence of governmental regulation designed to prevent dis-
criminatory policies in a private institution did not justify a finding
of state action.' 90
Although the law has met with a fair degree of success,' 9 ' the
Medical Society of the State of New York has called for "a restate-
ment and clarification of due process for physicians in hospitals and the
creation of a means of implementing [the] same.' 9 2 At the June
1974 meeting of the Medical Society House of Delegates, a com-
prehensive legislative proposal was approved and recommended
for implementation.' 9 3 The proposed legislation would bolster the
physician's rights within the hospital during the application and
reevaluation periods and guarantee due process protection
throughout. Therefore, it would complement section 2801-b and
would provide a more complete program of protection for the
physician. CONCLUSION
The physician confronted with a problem related to hospital
staff privileges in New York now has a number of viable alterna-
tives. The physician's initial attempt at remedying the problem
187 Id at 16, col. 6.
18 376 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 506 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1974). See notes 89-92
and accompanying text supra.
189 Id. at 802-05.
190 Id at 804-05. See also note 92 supra.
191 Aside from these two cases, there has been no other litigation in New York at a time
when litigation throughout the country has maintained the significant volume of the 1960's. See
Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 645 (1971).
192 Editorial, supra note 170, at 41 (emphasis in original).
193 Minutes of the 1974 House of Delegates, supra note 72, at 1272-73.
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should be through section 2801-b of the Public Health Law (or
section 206-a if applicable). Although the Public Health Council
possesses no direct enforcement power, its deterrent effect on
hospital practices enhances the physician's chances for success. The
physician cannot be guaranteed admission or retention of the
privileges, but the impending review of a dispute by the Council
forces a hospital to conduct thorough investigations and to pro-
duce valid justifications for its eventual decision.
If the physician is unsuccessful under the statutes, or chooses
to enter the courts directly, there is a choice of forum. In either
state or federal court, the physician should receive identical treat-
ment, i.e., protection against arbitrary or capricious actions, in a
controversy involving a public hospital. In the case of a private
hospital, prior to the passage of section 2801-b, both state and
federal courts were unreceptive to the physician's problem. Fur-
thermore, the only federal court in the state to deal with the prob-
lem has reaffirmed this position subsequent to the enactment
of section 2801-b. One can only speculate as to which forum will
provide the physician with a greater likelihood for success. It is
possible that the continuing debate in the federal courts through-
out the country may influence the federal courts in New York to
alter their position in favor of the physician. However, in light of
the narrow attitude expressed in Barrett, it is more reasonable to
expect that the presence of section 2801-b will produce a more
favorable treatment in the-state courts.
The statutory reform in New York is unique and has provided
the physician with a substantial advantage over his professional
colleagues in other states. The effort to remove the problem from
the courts and place it with impartial panels deserves recognition
and commendation. However, an appeal mechanism without the
power of resolution is insufficient. Although the strong deterrent
effect of the law may be one reason that staff privileges litigation in
New York has decreased dramatically in recent years, one cannot
be sure if the problem has been completely remedied. Indeed, the
continuing outcry from physicians for additional protection may
indicate that the current laws are inadequate. The legislature must
act to strengthen the Public Health Council, but at the same time, it
must not completely limit the discretion of the hospitals. This can
be accomplished by granting the Council the ability to petition the
courts for enforcement of its rulings in those situations where
there has been a violation of section 2801-b.
Jay A. Epstien
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